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I. 
PARTIES TO THIS PROCEEDING 
All parties to this proceeding are identified in the caption. Appellant Carol Capato 
was the plaintiff below. Appellees Garff Enterprises, Inc., Ken Garff, Tina Holbrook 
and Does 1 through 10 were the defendants. 
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rv. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated §78-2a-3(2)(j). 
V. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE 
Whether the trial court erred in determining, as a matter of law, that the "as is" 
documents allegedly signed by the plaintiff completely preclude all of the plaintiffs 
causes of action. (Minute entry, R. 134-6; A. 1-3) (See documents at issue included in 
the addendum at 35-37; R. 99-101) 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Since summary judgment is granted as a matter of law rather than fact, the 
appellate court is free to re-appraise the trial court's legal conclusion without any 
deference to those conclusions. Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991). 
"The standard of review, of course, for a summary judgment is one of correctness, with 
no deference afforded to the trial court." Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890, 896-7 
(Utah 1996). 
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VI. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
The plaintiff purchased a used 1986 Mercedes from the defendant, Garff 
Enterprises, in early June, 1996. In July, 1996, while the plaintiff was driving on 1-80, 
the airbag suddenly, unexpectedly and without reason deployed causing the plaintiff to 
lose control of the car. The plaintiff suffered personal injuries and property damage, 
including damage to the car, in the accident. (Complaint and jury demand, R. 1-8) 
The defendants maintain that the car was sold "as is" and without any sort of 
warranty. The defendants have produced copies of documents which purportedly support 
that position. (Memorandum in support of defendant's motion for summary judgment, 
R. 91-104) The plaintiff maintains that she did not sign those documents. Additionally, 
the plaintiff maintains, inter alia, that she relied upon statements made in the defendants' 
advertising and by the defendant Tina Holbrook during the sales negotiations which 
induced her to purchase the car. 
After the plaintiff and the defendant Tina Holbrook were deposed, the defendants 
moved the court for summary judgment maintaining that when the plaintiff purchased the 
car and allegedly signed an "as is - no warranty" form, prepared by the defendants, that 
the plaintiff waived all rights she could possibly have against the defendants for the 
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damages related to the improper deployment of the airbag. (Plaintiffs memorandum in 
opposition to defendant's motion for summary judgment does not appear to be in the 
record. It was filed on January 27, 1998 and is included in the addendum at 4-34. That 
memorandum is incorporated into the plaintiffs reply memorandum in support of motion 
to compel. R.122) 
The plaintiff moved the court for an order to stay its ruling on the defendant's 
motion for summary judgment and to compel discovery regarding defendant's advertising 
efforts. (R. 105-17) Oral argument was heard by the court on March 2, 1998. On 
March 16, 1998, the court entered it's minute entry granting the defendants' motion for 
summary judgment. (R. 134-6; A. 1-3) 
B. Statement of Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented for Review. 
On June 1, 1996, the plaintiff purchased from the defendants a used 1986 
Mercedes. The defendants maintain that the Mercedes had 126,850 miles on it at the 
time of the purchase. (R.91) The plaintiff took possession of the car on or about June 8, 
1996. (A. 19) When the plaintiff took possession of the car it had 127,195 miles on it. 
Apparently the defendant's service personnel drove the car 345 miles while the defendants 
retained possession of the car in order to tint it's windows as shown by the defendants' 
service report. At the time of the accident, the Mercedes had 129,263 miles on it. 
Although the plaintiff did not check the odometer at the time of the purchase, she denies 
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that she drove it 2,413 miles in the three weeks she had possession of the automobile 
before the accident. (A.20-22) 
Prior to agreeing to purchase the Mercedes, the plaintiff relied heavily upon the 
defendants' advertising schemes and promises made by the defendant Holbrook during 
the sales negotiations. (A.29-30) It is well known that the defendants advertised that 
they "back up every used car" they sell. They also represented in their advertising 
scheme that they had a "money back guarantee on all used cars". (A.27) Additionally, 
the plaintiff was specifically told by the defendant Holbrook at the time of the purchase 
that the defendants had "a checklist that they say they go down on every used car to make 
sure these cars are safe", and that "they had gone over this checklist". (A.27) The 
defendant Holbrook specifically stated "that the car was in perfect running order that 
[Garff] . . . had always maintained this car, it had always gotten all of it's checkups, it 
had always gotten maintained perfectly . . . and that it was already gone over by them 
before it was even put out on the lot. . . that it had already gone through their vigorous 
safety checks. (A.29-30) 
The "as is-no warranty" form was not displayed in the window of the Mercedes 
purchased by the plaintiff. The other used cars in the defendants' lot had such a form 
displayed. (A.28) The plaintiff denies having seen the "as is-no warranty" documents 
until they were presented to her at her deposition. (A.23-25) 
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The airbag deployed improperly due to the failure of the driveline flex disc, which 
was an original part on the 1986 Mercedes and was to have been replaced every three 
years or 30,000 miles. (A.iv, 34) Because the court did not require the defendants to 
fully answer the plaintiffs written discovery requests, the plaintiff was unable to discover 
whether the driveline flex disc should have been checked or replaced as part of the 
defendants' checklist allegedly followed prior to the sale of any used car. 
VII. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In ruling in favor of the defendants on their motion for summary judgment, the 
court stated that the defendants have "provided credible evidence that the plaintiff signed 
the "as is-no warranty" forms. The court apparently ignored the fact that the plaintiff 
specifically testified that she had not seen those disclaimers prior to her deposition. The 
plaintiff testified that she did not sign those documents. An issue of fact exists. This 
matter must be reversed and remanded to the trial court. 
The trial court also granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment because 
it felt that the plaintiff failed to "clearly specify any specific oral representations or 
advertising, or marketing, which induced her to buy the car." That conclusion is very 
surprising in that the court requested to review the plaintiffs entire deposition. The 
plaintiff in her deposition provided numerous specific reasons why she purchased the 
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Mercedes from the defendants and stated that she relied upon the defendants' advertising 
and other representations made during the sales negotiations in deciding to purchase the 
car. Again, fact issues exist requiring the matter be remanded. 
The "as is-no warranty" forms can only negate the existence of implied warranties. 
The express warranties made by the defendants in the advertising scheme and to the 
plaintiff directly survive. Finally, those forms are not effective to preclude the plaintiff 
from recovery for her personal injuries. 
vin. 
ARGUMENT 
Summary judgment is precluded, in the first instance, by the dispute concerning 
the circumstances of the purchase. Genuine issues of material fact exist as to the alleged 
signing of the forms and the defendants' promises. Moreover, even if the defendants' 
version is accepted as true, the motion still fails as a matter of law. A disclaimer can only 
be effective as to implied warranties. The defendants made express warranties. The 
disclaimer is not effective as to plaintiffs recovery for personal injuries under any theory. 
A, 
The Dispute As To The Circumstances Of The Purchase 
Transaction Precludes Summary Judgment 
Summary judgment is not appropriate where there exists a dispute as to facts, 
which are material to the transaction in question. See Freed Finance Co. v. Stoker Motor 
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Co., 537 P.2d 1039 (Utah 1975) ; TSI Partnership v. Allred, 877 P.2d 156 (Utah App. 
1994). Such is the case here. 
The plaintiff denies seeing or signing the relevant documents at the time she 
purchased the car. She has stated, that the "as-is" document was not displayed in the 
car's window. Even if the evidence shows that plaintiff signed these documents, there 
is a dispute as to whether she did so knowingly and after the terms of the sale were called 
to her attention. See Thomas v. Ruddle Lease-Sales, Inc., 716 P.2d 911, 915 (Wash. 
App. 1986). (A disclaimer is not effective unless it was negotiated and explained to the 
used car buyer.) 
Moreover, the meaning of at least one of the documents proffered by the 
defendants is far from clear. See Sandberg v. Klein, 576 P.2d 1291 (Utah 1978). (A 
dispute as to meaning or interpretation of facts precludes summary judgment.) The 
"Nothing owed/Nothing promised" document appears to be a work order form for service 
to be performed without charge. That is, it reflects items which the dealer acknowledges 
need to be corrected. "Nothing owed/nothing promised" seems to reflect that no items 
need to be repaired. Such has nothing to do with disclaiming any warranty. Indeed, this 
document can be more properly construed as a representation by the defendants that the 
car was not in need of any type of service. That construction is consistent with the 
defendant Holbrook's promise that the car was in "perfect running order." 
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Finally, the plaintiff has testified as to specific representations by the defendants, 
which could constitute express warranties, including: that the car had been inspected. See 
e.g. Touchet Valley Grain v. Opp & Seibold Construction, 831 P.2d 724, 731 (Wash. 
1992) (A statement that fabricating was "carefully checked" was an express warranty); 
and, that defendants "backed" their used cars, see e.g. Welchman v. Wood, 353 P.2d 165, 
167 (Utah 1960) ("person may warrant the occurrence of future events . . . such a 
warranty is in effect a promise to respond in damages"). Whether or not such a 
statement is a warranty or merely an opinion is a question of fact for the jury. See 
Management Comm. of Gray stone Pines Homeowners Assoc, v. Gray stone Pines, Inc., 
652 P.2d 896, 900 (Utah 1982); Park v. Moorman Mfg. Co., 241 P.2d 914, 918 (Utah 
1952). As discussed below, neither express warranties nor tort liability are within the 
scope of the alleged disclaimer here. 
B. 
At Most, The Alleged Disclaimer Negates the Existence Of Only Implied 
Warranties 
Section 70A-2-316(3)(a), U.C.A., upon which defendants rely, provides, that "all 
implied warranties are excluded by expressions like 'as is.'" It says nothing about such 
language excluding express warranties, much less strict liability, negligence or fraud. 
Indeed, it is well-accepted that such causes of action (all of which plaintiff pleads here) 
survive such disclaimers. 
8 
1. Express Warranty 
Count II in the plaintiffs complaint pleads a claim for breach of express warranty, 
as well as implied warranty. It is well-settled that statements or representations in 
advertising (as is alleged here) can constitute express warranties. See Touchet Valley 
Grain, 831 P.2d at 731; Deaton, Inc. v. Aeroglide Corp., 657 P.2d 109, 112 (N.M. 
1983); State by Div. of Cons. Prot. v. GAF Corp., 760 P.2d 310, 314-15 (Utah 1988); 
Jensen v. Seigel Mobile Homes Group, 668 P.2d 65, 71 (Idaho 1983). It is equally well-
settled that a disclaimer "is inoperative when [it] is inconsistent with the language creating 
the express warranty." Jensen, 668 P.2d at 71. See also Deaton, Inc., 657 P.2d at 112; 
State v. GAF, 760 P.2d at 314-15. This applies to oral, as well as written, express 
warranties. See Miller v. Hubbard-Wray Co., 630 P.2d 880 (Or. App. 1981). Indeed, 
the statute, §70A-2-316(l), expressly provides that a disclaimer is "inoperative to the 
extent that [a] construction [reconciling it with an express warranty] is unreasonable." 
Thus, even if the disclaimer is effective as to implied warranties, plaintiff may still 
proceed on her express warranty claim. The motion for summary judgment must be 
denied. 
2. Tort Claims 
Counts I, III and IV in the plaintiffs complaint plead claims, respectively, for 
strict liability, negligence and fraud. The defendants maintain that their disclaimers 
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preclude all of those claims; however, such disclaimers "have no effect on plaintiffs 
recovery under common-law strict liability." Washington Water Power v. Graybar 
Electric, 114 P.2d 1199, 1203 (Wash. 1989). See also Waggoner v. Town & Country 
Mobile Homes, Inc., 808 P.2d 649, 652 (Okl. 1990); Elite Professionals, Inc. v. Carrier 
Corp., 827 P.2d 1195, 1201 (Ky. App. 1992). Excluding implied warranties does not 
preclude a negligence claim. See Elite Prof., 827 P.2d at 1202-3; Waggoner, 808 P.2d 
at 652. See also Groen v. Tri-O-Inc, 667 P.2d 598, 604 (Utah 1983) ("cause of action 
in warranty is separate from a cause of action in negligence"). "[A] contract clause 
limiting liability will not be applied in a fraud action." Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602, 
608 (Utah 1974). Indeed, fraud in connection with the disclaimer would permit recovery 
on an implied warranty. See Lamb, 525 P.2d at 608. 
C. 
The Disclaimer Is Ineffective As To A Personal Injury Claim 
Under Any Theory 
All of the cases cited by the defendants below involved economic loss—that is, the 
damages were for loss of the value of the goods sold. Other damages, particularly for 
personal injuries, are different, and the defendants' cases do not apply. 
In contrast to economic loss, "the parties to a sales contact may not limit a 
manufacturer's liability for personal injury caused by a product defect." Waggoner, 808 
P.2d at 652. This applies to warranty claims, both express and implied, as well as tort 
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claims. See e.g. Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d 1006, 1010 (Utah 1991) ("implied warranties 
are designed to protect ordinary consumers who do not have the knowledge, capacity or 
opportunity to insure that goods which they are buying are in safe condition"); Elite 
Prof., 827 P.2d at 1197 (every damage to property other than goods purchased is 
different where disclaimer is concerned). In this regard, §2-719(3) of the U.C.C. (70A-
2-719(e), U.C.A.), provides: 
Consequential damages may be limited or 
excluded unless the limitation or exclusion is 
unconscionable. Limitation of consequential 
damages for injury to the person in the case of 
consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable 
(emphasis added)1 
The plaintiff suffered personal injuries as the result of a defect in goods purchased 
in a consumer transaction. The defendants cannot exclude their liability for such injuries. 
At a minimum, because this is a consumer transaction, the presumption of 
unconscionability under §70A-2-719(3) creates a factual dispute and precludes summary 
judgment. 
*It is also noteworthy that, as of April 29, 1996-just before the sale and accident-it 
became a class B misdemeanor to knowingly fail to repair/rearm an airbag system. See 
§41-6-145, U.C.A. This duty applies to vehicle owners, dealers and maintenance 
facilities, and underscores the fundamental importance of the reliability of this safety 
equipment. 
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IX. 
CONCLUSION 
Only a very narrow portion of plaintiffs case is susceptible at all to summary 
judgment based upon the alleged disclaimer-recovery for the value of the car, itself, 
under an implied warranty theory. Even as to that claim, the dispute as to what occurred 
when the car was purchased precludes summary judgment. As a matter of law, the 
disclaimer is ineffective as to most of plaintiffs' claims-all damages, including the car, 
under strict liability, negligence or fraud, and, personal injury damages under all theories. 
Accordingly, the trial court incorrectly granted the defendants' motion for 
summary judgment. This matter should be reversed and remanded for further 
proceedings. 
DATED this day of September, 1998. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
By: 
MARK DALTON DUNN 
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Third Judicial District 
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W
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
CAROL CAPATO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GARFP ENTERPRISES, INC., KEN 
6ARPF, TENA HOLBROOK and 
DOES 1 through 10 inclusive, 
Defendants• 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NO. 970901748 
Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment comes before the Court 
pursuant to Rule 4-501. Oral argument was had on March 2, 1998, 
and thereafter the entire deposition of plaintiff was submitted to 
the Court for review in support of the Motion. 
Defendant has provided credible evidence that the plaintiff 
signed a Motor Vehicle Contract of Sale, which specifically says 
that the buyer has seen a copy of the FTC Used Car Buyers Guide. 
This paragraph was specifically signed by the plaintiff. Defendant 
also submits an "As Is-No Warranty" document, also signed by the 
plaintiff, and an additional document entitled "We Owe You" on 
which is written "Nothing owed/Nothing promised", which is also 
signed by the plaintiff. Defendant's argument is that plaintiff 
purchased a car with no warranties, and therefore has no claims 
1 
CAPATO V. GARFF PAGE TWO MINUTE ENTRY 
against the defendant for the accidental discharge of the airbag 
while the vehicle was operating and any injuries attendant thereto• 
Plaintiff responds with a Motion to Compel Discovery and 
Motion to Stay, and the argument that defendant's disclaimers don't 
apply to the causes of action alleged in the Complaint, including 
strict liability, express and implied warranty, negligence and 
fraud. Plaintiff relies upon the advertising and marketing done by 
defendants to the effect that "We stand behind every car we sell", 
"Any purchaser of a used car is entitled to their money back under 
certain conditions", and some possible oral representation that 
this car was thoroughly checked out before the sale, and such an 
inspection would have revealed the defect which resulted in the 
airbag deployments The plaintiff fails in her deposition, or 
otherwise, to clearly specify any specific oral representations or 
advertising, or marketing, which induced her to buy the car. In 
the absence of anything specific to that effect, and with the 
clear, written waiver signed by the plaintiff, defendant is 
entitled to Summary Judgment. 
2 
CAPATO V. GARFF PAGE THREE MINUTE ENTRY 
Counsel for defendant shall prepare an Order consistent with 
this ruling. 
Dated this .day of March, 1998. 
STEPHEN L.: HENRIOD 4 
DISTRICT. COURT JUDGE/ 
MARK DALTON DUNN - 4562 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
3575 South Market Street, #206 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 
Telephone: (801) 966-8111 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CAROL CAPATO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GARFF ENTERPRISES, INC., KEN 
GARFF, TINA HOLBROOK and DOES 1 
through 10 inclusive, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 970901748 
Judge Stephen L. Henroid 
INTRODUCTION 
The plaintiff, Carol Capato, filed a four-count complaint to recover for personal injuries 
and property damage, which she suffered when the airbag of a car purchased from defendants 
deployed improperly. The theories alleged are as follows: count I, strict liability; count II, 
express and implied warranty; count IQ, negligence; and, count IV, fraud. The defendants have 
moved for summary judgment as to all counts solely on the ground of an alleged warranty 
disclaimer. The defendants' motion must be denied. As a matter of law, such a disclaimer is 
i 
4 
effective~if at all—only as to an implied warranty claim. Indeed, it should be entirely ineffective 
as any claim to recover for personal injuries, regardless of the theory. 
The plaintiff has filed a motion requiring the defendants to produce discovery regarding 
their advertising scheme and a motion to stay the court's ruling on the defendants' motion for 
summary judgment. The positions of the parties are directly in opposition on the issue of 
whether the defendants' advertising scheme and other verbal representations created implied and 
express warranties upon which the plaintiff may reasonably rely when purchasing a car. 
Direction from the court is critical as to how this case will proceed with regard to discovery and 
ultimately to trial. 
n. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary and Overview 
The plaintiff purchased a used 1986 Mercedes from the defendant, Garff Enterprises, in 
early June, 1996. In July, 1996, while plaintiff was driving on 1-80, the airbag suddenly 
deployed causing plaintiff to lose control of the car. The plaintiff suffered personal injuries and 
property damage (including damage to the car) in the accident. 
The defendants maintain that the car was sold "as is" and without any sort of warranty. 
They have produced copies of documents which purportedly support that position. The plaintiff 
maintains, among other things, that she relied upon statements made in the defendants' 
advertising in purchasing the car. 
ii 
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B. Disputed Material Facts 
The plaintiff disputes the following facts, which the defendants assert are undisputed. 
1. The plaintiff disputes the assertions in paragraph 1 of the defendants' statement 
of rundisputed material facts \ that she obtained the car on June 1, 1996 and that its odometer 
showed 126,850 at the time. The plaintiff took possession of the car about one week after the 
purchase date-ie. around June 8, 1996. (PI. Depo., p. 5)1 Although the plaintiff did not check 
the odometer at the time of purchase, she denies that she drove it 2,413 miles in the three weeks 
before the accident. (PL Depo., pp. 11-13) It is interesting to note that the car apparently had 
127,195 miles on it before the plaintiff took possession of it. (See service report attached as 
Exhibit B.) Either the documents are wrong or the defendants' service personnel drove the car 
345 miles while the defendants retained possession of it to tint the windows. 
2. The plaintiff denies the implication of paragraph 3 of the defendants' statement, 
that she was advised that the car was sold "as is" and without warranty. (PL Depo., p. 52) The 
plaintiff denies seeing or reviewing the document designated at tabs 2 and 3 of the defendants' 
motion, until her deposition. (PL Depo., pp. 18-20) 
3. The plaintiff also denies seeing or reviewing the document referred to in 
paragraph 4 of the defendants' statement (at tab 4), until her deposition. (PL Depo., pp. 19-20) 
4. The plaintiff denies signing the documents referred to in paragraph 5 of the 
defendants' statement. (PL Depo., pp. 18-20) 
E x c e r p t s from p l a i n t i f f ' s depos i t i on , c i t e d a s " P i . Depo." 
a r e a t t a c h e d as E x h i b i t A. 
iii 
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5. The plaintiff objects to paragraph 6 of the defendants' statement to the extent that 
it discusses inferences and does not state facts.2 
C. Additional Material Facts 
1. The airbag deployed improperly due to the failure of the driveline flex disc, which 
was an original part and was to have been replaced every 3 years or 30,000 miles. (Def. Ans. 
to Interrog. Also see the vehicle repair estimate attached as Exhibit C.) 
2. A form indicating "as is-no warranty" was not displayed in the window of the car 
purchased by the plaintiff, although such a form was displayed on other cars. (PL Depo., p. 64) 
3. The plaintiff purchased the car in response to an advertising campaign, in which 
defendants' stated, "we back up every used car we sell" and, represented that they had a "money 
back guaranty on all used cars". (PL Depo., p. 62) 
4. The plaintiff was told, at the time of purchase, that the defendants had "a checklist 
that they say they go down on every used car to make sure these cars are safe" and, that "they 
had gone over this checklist". (PL Depo., p. 62) 
5. The plaintiff was also told: 
that the car was in perfect running order, that 
[Garff] . . . had always maintained [the] car, it had 
always gotten all of its checkups . . . and that it 
was already gone over by them before it was even 
put out on the lot . . . 
2The defendants cite no authority supporting the inference to 
which they claim to be entitled; however, this is only marginally 
important, at this point, because the defendants' motion fails as 
a matter of law on other grounds. 
iv 
7 
that it had already gone through their vigorous 
safety checks. 
(PI. Depo., pp. 71-72.) 
6. The plaintiff relied upon the above, and other, representations in purchasing the 
car. (PL Depo., pp., 71-72) 
v 
8 
in. 
ARGUMENT 
Summary judgment is precluded, in the first instance, by the dispute concerning the 
circumstances of the purchase. Moreover, even if the defendants' version is accepted as true, 
(which it should not be, as they are the moving party) the motion still fails as a matter of law. 
A disclaimer can only be effective as to implied warranties. The disclaimer is not effective as 
to recovery for personal injuries under any theory. 
A. 
The Dispute As To The Circumstances Of The Purchase 
Transaction Precludes Summary Judgment 
Summary judgment is not appropriate where there exists a dispute as to facts, which are 
material to the transaction in question. See Freed Finance Co. v. Stoker Motor Co., 537 P.2d 
1039 (Utah 1975); TSI Partnership v. Alfred, 877 P.2d 156 (Utah App. 1994). Such is the case 
here. 
The plaintiff denies seeing or signing the relevant documents, at the time she purchased 
the car. She has stated, that the "as-is" document was not displayed in the car's window. Even 
if the evidence shows that plaintiff signed these documents, there is a dispute as to whether she 
did so knowingly and after the terms of the sale were called to her attention. See Thomas v. 
Ruddle Lease-Sales, Inc., 716 P.2d 911, 915 (Wash. App. 1986). (A disclaimer is not effective 
unless it was negotiated and explained to used car buyer.) 
9 
Moreover, the meaning of at least one of the documents proffered by the defendants is 
far from clear. See Sandberg v. Klein, 576 P.2d 1291 (Utah 1978). (A dispute as to meaning 
or interpretation of facts precludes summary judgment.) The document at tab 4 appears to be 
a work order form for service to be performed without charge. That is, it reflects items which 
the dealer acknowledges need to be corrected. "Nothing owed/nothing promised" seems to 
reflect that no items need to be repaired. Such has nothing to do with disclaiming any warranty. 
Indeed, this document can be more properly construed as a representation by the defendants that 
the car was not in need of any type of service. 
Finally, the plaintiff has testified as to specific representations by the defendants, which 
could constitute express warranties, including: that the car had been inspected. See e.g. Touchet 
Valley Grain v. Opp & Seibold Construction, 831 P.2d 724, 731 (Wash. 1992) (A statement that 
fabricating was "carefully checked" was an express warranty); and, that defendants "backed" 
their used cars, see e j ^ Welchman v. Wood, 353 P.2d 165, 167 (Utah 1960) ("person may 
warrant the occurrence of future events . . . such a warranty is in effect a promise to respond 
in damages"). Whether or not such a statement is a warranty or merely an opinion is a question 
of fact for the jury. See Management Comm. of Gray stone Pines Homeowners Assoc, v. 
Graystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896, 900 (Utah 1982); Park v. Moorman Mfg. Co., 241 P.2d 
914, 918 (Utah 1952). As discussed below, neither express warranties nor tort liability are 
within the scope of the alleged disclaimer here. 
2 
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B. 
At Most, The Alleged Disclaimer Negates the Existence Of Only Implied 
Warranties 
Section 70 A-2-316(3)(a), U.C. A., upon which defendants rely, provides, that "all implied 
warranties are excluded by expressions like 'as is.'" (emphasis added). It says nothing about 
such language excluding express warranties, much less strict liability, negligence or fraud. 
Indeed, it is well-accepted that such causes of action (all of which plaintiff pleads here) survive 
such disclaimers. 
1. Express Warranty 
Count II pleads a claim for breach of express warranty, as well as implied warranty. It 
is well-settled that statements or representations in advertising (as is alleged here) can constitute 
express warranties. See Touchet Valley Grain, 831 P.2d at 731; Deaton, Inc. v. Aeroglide 
Corp., 657 P.2d 109, 112 (N.M. 1983); State by Div. of Cons. Prot. v. GAF Corp., 760 P.2d 
310, 314-15 (Utah 1988); Jensen v. Seigel Mobile Homes Group, 668 P.2d 65, 71 (Idaho 1983). 
It is equally well-settled that a disclaimer "is inoperative when [it] is inconsistent with the 
language creating the express warranty." Jensen, 668 P.2d at 71. See also Deaton, Inc., 657 
P.2d at 112; State v. GAF, 760 P.2d at 314-15. This applies to oral, as well as written, express 
warranties. See Miller v. Hubbard-Wray Co., 630 P.2d 880 (Or. App. 1981). Indeed, the 
statute, §70A-2-316(l), expressly provides that a disclaimer is "inoperative to the extent that [a] 
construction [reconciling it with an express warranty] is unreasonable." 
3 
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Thus, even if the disclaimer is effective as to implied warranties, plaintiff may still 
proceed on her express warranty claim. The motion for summary judgment must be denied. 
2. Tort Claims 
Counts I, III and IV plead claims, respectively, for strict liability, negligence and fraud. 
The sale argument made by the defendants is, that these claims are excluded by their alleged 
disclaimer. This is incorrect, and summary judgment as to these counts must be denied. 
Such disclaimers "have no effect on plaintiffs recovery under common-law strict 
liability." Washington Water Power v. Graybar Electric, 714 P.2d 1199, 1203 (Wash. 1989). 
See also Waggoner v. Town & Country Mobile Homes, Inc., 808 P.2d 649, 652 (Okl. 1990); 
Elite Professionals, Inc. v. Carrier Corp., 827 P.2d 1195, 1201 (Ky. App. 1992). Excluding 
implied warranties does not preclude a negligence claim. See Elite Prof, 827 P.2d at 1202-3; 
Waggoner, 808 P.2d at 652. See also Groen v. Tri-O-Inc, 667 P.2d 598, 604 (Utah 1983) 
("cause of action in warranty is separate from a cause of action in negligence"). "[A] contract 
clause limiting liability will not be applied in a fraud action." Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602, 
608 (Utah 1974).3 
3. The Cases Cited By The Defendants Are Not To The Contrary 
All of the cases cited by the defendants involved breach of warranty claims. Those cases 
have no application to the plaintiffs tort claims, and the defendants cite no authority for granting 
summary judgment as to these counts. Indeed, even the defendants tacitly acknowledge, that 
3Indeed, fraud in connection with the disclaimer would permit 
recovery on an implied warranty. See Lamb, 525 P.2d at 608. 
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those authorities apply only to implied warranty claims by referring to "implied warranties" in 
describing the cases. To the extent that two of those cases might be construed as applying to 
express warranty claims, such a view is in conflict with the plain language of §70A-2-316(l). 
See Schneider v. Miller, 597 N.E. 2d 175 (Ohio App. 1991); Nick Miklacki Const. Co. v. 
M.J.L. Truck Sales, Inc., 515 N.E. 2d 24 (Ohio App. 1986). 
Defendants cite only one case from Utah, Billings Yamaha v. Rick Warner Ford, 681 
P.2d 1276 (Utah 1984), which also involved only warranty (not tort) claims. The holding there 
was not based upon the warranty disclaimer but, rather, upon plaintiffs, failure to prove the 
terms of any warranty by written evidence or oral testimony. 681 P.2d at 1278. The disclaimer 
discussion was a secondary rational in response to a dissent. Id. This has little to do with the 
present case. 
C. 
The Disclaimer Is Ineffective As To A Personal Injury Claim 
Under Any Theory 
All of the cases cited by the defendants involved economic loss-that is, the damages were 
for loss of the value of the goods sold. Other damages, particularly for personal injuries, are 
different, and the defendants' cases do not apply. 
In contrast to economic loss, "the parties to a sales contact may not limit a 
manufacturer's liability for personal injury caused by a product defect." Waggoner, 808 P.2d 
at 652. This applies to warranty claims, both express and implied, as well as tort claims. See 
e.g. Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d 1006, 1010 (Utah 1991) ("implied warranties are designed to 
5 
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protect ordinary consumers who do not have the knowledge, capacity or opportunity to insure 
that goods which they are buying are in safe condition"); Elite Prof., 827 P.2d at 1197 (every 
damage to property other than goods purchased is different where disclaimer is concerned). In 
this regard, §2-719(3) of the U.C.C. (70A-2-719(e), U.C.A.), provides: 
Consequential damages may be limited or excluded 
unless the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. 
Limitation of consequential damages for injury to 
the person in the case of consumer goods is prima 
facie unconscionable . . . . 
(emphasis added)4 
The plaintiff suffered personal injuries as the result of a defect in goods purchased in a 
consumer transaction. The defendants cannot exclude their liability for such injuries. At a 
minimum, because this is a consumer transaction, the presumption of unconscionability under 
§70A-2-719(3) creates a factual dispute and precludes summary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
Only a very narrow portion of plaintiff s case is susceptible at all to summary judgment 
based upon the alleged disclaimer-recovery for the value of the car, itself, under an implied 
warranty theory. Even as to that claim, the dispute as to what occurred when the car was 
purchased precludes summary judgment. As a matter of law, the disclaimer is ineffective as to 
4It is also noteworthy that, as of April 29, 1996--just before 
the sale and accident--it became a class B misdemeanor to knowingly 
fail to repair/rearm an airbag system. See §41-6-145, U.C.A. This 
duty applies to vehicle owners, dealers and maintenance facilities, 
and underscores the fundamental importance of the reliability of 
this safety equipment. 
6 
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most of plaintiffs' claims—all damages, including the car, under strict liability, negligence or 
fraud, and, personal injury damages under all theories. 
Accordingly, the defendants' motion for summary judgment must be denied. 
DATED this 27th day of January, 1998. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
MARK DALTON DUNN 
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Q. Did you drive the Mercedes away from the 
Garff place of business on that day? 
A. I can't exactly remember because they had to 
do tinting on the windows and buffing the paint and it 
took a week. 
Q. I see. 
A. So I am not sure. I think that was 
afterwards. They did that as soon as I did all this 
paperwork, then it went into the shop to have that done. 
Q. And then you came back and got the Mercedes? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did whatever you wanted with the 
Mercedes? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now on Deposition Exhibit 1, again, there is 
a place on the form for odometer reading at the time you 
signed Deposition Exhibit 1. It says 126,853 miles, do 
you see that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Does that comport with your memory of the 
mileage of the vehicle at the time you purchased the 
car? 
A. As I remember. As I recall. 
Q. On the 3rd of July 3rd of 1996, you were 
eastbound on 1-80 going to Wyoming? 
19 
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about it* 
Q. Let me hand you a copy of what has been 
marked as your Deposition Exhibit 5. It is the odometer 
statement* Is that your signature on that one? 
A* Yes, it is. 
Q. The 1st of June of 1996? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So you were aware that one also said the 
odometer reading at time you purchased that car was 
126,853 miles. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you look at that one before you signed 
it? 
A. When I signed it we were in the office, we 
were not by the car for me to look at the odometer, to 
match it up and see if it was correct. 
Q. I understand that. That's not my question. 
Did you look at the form to see that you were being 
informed what the odometer reading was by this statement 
before you signed it? 
A. Yes• 
Q. Do you have any explanation how you put 2,413 
miles on the car between the 1st of June and the 3rd of 
July 1996? 
A. No. 
20 
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1 Q. Just driving around town? 
2 A. Well, like I said, I didn't have it for a 
3 week* I never really looked at the mileage* I didn't 
4 even drive it that much, so there is no way I could have 
5 put that many miles on it. I didn't get to drive it* I 
6 have a business and I drive the business truck so it sat 
7 quite a bit. 
8 1 Q. Did anybody else drive the 1986 Mercedes in 
9 that 32 days other than you? 
10 A. No. Not that I know of. Like I said, it was 
11 with them a week, I don't know what they did but I 
12 didn't. No one that I knew drove the car. 
13 Q. What other licensed motor vehicle operators 
14 were there in your family at that time? 
15 A. None. 
16 Q. A husband? 
17 A. No, I don't have a husband. 
18 Q. You were the head of your household at that 
19 time? 
20 A. Correct. 
21 Q. Had these two kids that you already told me 
22 about? 
23 A- Yes. 
24 Q. Who were not licensed? 
25 A. No, they are too young. 
"2T 
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Q. They are sixteen year old? 
A* She is sixteen now. 
Q. I see. Any other children in your home at 
that point? 
A. No. 
Q. So nobody had access t o the motor v e h i c l e 
during t h a t 30 days other than you? 
A. No. 
Q. So it is your testimony that you didn't put 
2,413 miles on it in that 32 days? 
A. I know I couldn't have put that many on it 
really. I mean if you say it was that many breaking down 
per day because I didn't drive it anywhere else. That 
was going to be the big long haul, to take it on a road 
trip. Actually, I was quite excited to be able to drive 
it. 
Q. What road trip? 
A. To go up to Evans ton, that was going to be 
the long jaunt for the car. I hadn't gotten to drive it 
a whole lot. 
Q. When you first saw this 1986 Mercedes, where 
was it? 
A. Down at the Ken Garff dealership up 
underneath like an awning. There is a long awning and it 
was up parked on it like that. Actually, it was the 
22 
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Approximately a year ago. 
And left that car here in Utah with you? 
Yes. 
Where is that car now; still with you? 
Actually, I drove it here today. 
Let me show you what has been marked to your 
as Exhibit 3. Is that your signature down 
at the bottom? 
A. 
Q-
Deposition 
Exhibit No 
A
* 
Q. 
bold print 
A. 
Q» 
A. 
Q. 
It appears to be. 
Do you know if what has been marked as 
Exhibit 3 is the back side of Deposition 
. 2? 
This is on the back of that? 
Yeah. See where it says Buyer's Guide in 
all caps at the top of Deposition Exhibit 2? 
Uh-huh. 
Do you see that? 
Yes, I do. 
Do you see on Deposition Exhibit No. 3 where 
you can see it coming through the back side? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Deposition 
Yes, I see that. 
Buyer's Guide? 
Uh-huh. 
Is that your signature down at the bottom of 
Exhibit 3? 
23 
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A. Actually, it appears to be my signature. I 
don't know because I never saw this. 
Q. You never saw what? 
A. This As Is—No Warranty, this particular 
thing that goes in all the cars, I didn't ever see this, 
so— 
MR. GRAY: You are referring to Exhibit 2? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, I am sorry, Exhibit 2. I 
can't explain it except I never got to see that Exhibit 
2. 
Q. (Mr. Henderson) Is this the first time you 
have ever seen Deposition Exhibit 2? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Let me show you what has been marked to your 
deposition Exhibit No. 4. Is that your signature down 
at the bottom of Deposition Exhibit 4? 
A. It appears to be my signature. 
Q. This is a preprinted form in all caps We Owe 
You statement. Do you see the words in there, "Nothing 
owed/Nothing Promised1'? 
A. I see that. 
Q. Were those words on there when you s igned the 
form? 
A. How do I answer that? I don ' t remember 
s ign ing t h i s form; in fac t , I have never seen t h i s form 
24 
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and I have no copy of that form as far as this Nothing 
Owed/Nothing Promised, I am not even sure what that 
means because I did owe money on it. I did end up 
financing part of the car somewhere. Does that even 
mean—? 
Q. Are you saying that's not your signature down 
at the bottom of Deposition Exhibit No. 4? 
A. No, that appears to be my signature. 
Q. Then back to my question: Were those words 
written in the form at the time you signed it? 
A. I don't believe so. 
Q. Who at Ken Garff did you have any 
conversations with about the 1986 Mercedes? 
A. Tena Holbrook, the woman that talked me into 
getting the windows tinted and the paint buffed, and 
then whoever the man was that did the financing, and 
then also a man named Ryan, a service manager. 
Q. Who was the first person at Ken Garff that 
you had any dealings with on the Mercedes? 
A. Tena, Tena Holbrook. 
Q. You have already told me how she showed you 
the car the first time you saw the car. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you test drive it at that time? 
A. I can't remember if I did or not, I know I 
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I just knew it was a good idea and I wanted to get one. 
Yes, I knew it didn't come for free. Of course, you are 
going to have to pay more for it or something. 
Q. Any other discussions with Tena about a 
warranty other than what you just told me about the 
extended warranty? 
A. Not that I can recall because I was just 
basically waiting for it, I thought it was just as much 
as her going in amd checking with somebody to get it and 
then come back and tell me, "Oh, yes. Okay. Well, here 
it is. This is how much you have to pay," or something. 
I was waiting for an answer. 
Q. Were you ever told by Tena or anybody at Ken 
Garff that you were purchasing the 1986 Mercedes as is? 
A. No. 
Q. Had you ever purchased a motor vehicle as is 
before the 3rd of July of 1996? 
A. I purchased a used car from another 
dealership a long time ago but I can't remember if it 
was as is or not, it was a Hyundai, Hyundai Sonata. 
Q. Here in Salt Lake? 
A. It was a little dealership right off of 90th 
LSouth, they are not even there any more, I don't think. 
Q. Was this the first time in your life you 
purchased a used car? 
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A. Yes, I did have an idea in my mind. 
Q. What did you think? 
A. Have you seen Ken Garff's commercial? 
Q. Yes, I have* 
A. Have you seen Ken Garff standing behind a car 
saying, "We back up every used car we sell.H Have you 
also seen the one that says we have a no hassle 100 
percent money back guaranty on all used cars we sell? 
That's what I saw and that's why I went there because I 
trusted them. 
Q. Ken Garff? 
A* The whole dealership, I trusted them, I 
believed it when they said that. They have also a 
checklist that they say that they go down on every used 
car to make sure these cars are safe and they told me 
they had gone over this checklist. 
Q, Did you have any discussion with anybody 
about the fact that the vehicle that you were interested 
in; that is the 1986 Mercedes, was there as a 
consignment vehicle? 
A. She had— I didn't know it was a consignment 
vehicle. She said it used to be her car and then she 
had a nice new one that looked like a roller skate, I 
didn't know what type it was, I didn't really think much 
of it. I thought she had traded it in for that little 
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me to repeat it? 
A. Go ahead and repeat it, 
Q. As you saw the form that's Deposition Exhibit 
2 in the other cars for sale on the Ken Garff lot? 
A. Uh-huh. Yes. 
Q. Did it cross your mind to make inquiry as to 
where such a warning was in the 1986 Mercedes? 
A. I did inquire. I asked her where it was and 
she said, "Isn't it there?" And she went around and she 
said, "Yes, you are right, it is not there." That was 
it, I never did get to see one. It was not there on the 
window and I do have witnesses that were there, too, 
that saw that it was not there. 
Q. Who is that? 
A. Candace Keele, Jennifer Schiers, and then, of 
course, my two little kids. 
Q. Who is Candace? 
A. Candace Keele is my little sister's best 
friend, and Jennifer Schiers is my little sister. 
Q. They were there with you, were they? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Which day or all of them? 
A. I had gone back a couple of times to look at 
the car and it usually was sitting, in fact, it was 
always sitting right there in that spot and I can't 
28 
Page 71 
A, No. 
Q. You have an allegation in your complaint that 
you were a victim of fraud and I am wondering what is it 
that you claim that you were told that— 
A* I was told— 
Q. Let me finish my question. An element of 
fraud is not only that you were told something that 
proves to not be true but also the people that told it 
to you knew it was not true at the time they told it to 
you. What was it about the acquisition of the 1986 
Mercedes that you claim you were told was not true and 
the people that told it to you knew it was not true when 
they told it to you? 
A. I was told that the car was in perfect 
running order, that Ken Garff, you know, the car lot, 
had taken— had always maintained this car, it had 
always gotten all of its checkups, it had always gotten 
maintained perfectly; in fact, it had always been in the 
Ken Garff family, the people that owned it had also 
worked for Ken Garff there and that it was already gone 
over by them before it was even put out on the lot. 
Q. That's it? 
A. Well, yes, basically that it was in excellent 
working order, that it was a safe, dependable car, and 
that, like I said, that it had already gone through 
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their vigorous safety checks, 
Q. How many days couldn't you work after the 3rd 
of July? 
A. I couldn't tell you the exact amount. I have 
got my partner getting all the information on the 
computer for you guys. You know, I had quite a few days 
sometimes I could work but I would only do a few jobs 
and get a terrible headache or something, compared to 
before when I would do ten jobs. 
Q. You actually go to residences or other places 
of business and do the pest control yourself? 
A. Yes. 
Q. I see. 
A. It is not strenuous at all, it is, you know, 
I mean it was a little strenuous but, yes, I can perform 
that job. 
Q. Were you laid up for a couple of days that 
you didn't work at all? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How long? 
A. I would say for about, I don't know, three to 
four days. Everything kind of started hurting a week or 
so afterwards. I mean I think I was in shock so I 
didn't really know the extent of what was going on, but 
I do remember one weekend that I fell asleep on Thursday 
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FUNCTION --H 
CAPATO,CAROL S 
1787 EAST LINCOLN LANE 
HOLLAOAY UT 84124 
HOME PHONE 801 3 6 3 - 6 1 5 2 
BUS. PHONE 801 9 6 3 - 2 4 9 6 
86 MERCEDES 19QE 1 2 3 2 6 6 
Command? ( E n t e r , * , N , VEH, CUST, 
152? 
?) . 
CUSTOMER 
DELV. DATE 
IN SERVICE 
WAF .E,'P. DATE 
LICENSE NO. 
SLEMN 
. . . ?* 
GC019 
01- J UN 9 6 
01JUN36 
KEY N STKP 
1110 
GF £ . « i * ~ ' i i J 
18 
1 8 
.18 
18 
18 
DLR CODE 
ENG NO. 
TRAN NO. 
AXLE NO. 
COLOR 
PROD DATE 
TYPE 
STOCK NO. 
DEL CODE 
LAST SERV 
KG/OLDS 
1 4 0 . 3 CID G< 
A 
USED 
GC013 
24 
01JUN96 
Command"' ( E n t e r , * , N , VEH, CUST, ?) 
Command'5 ( E n t e r , * , N , VEH, CUST, ?) 
RO NO 
w n a • • 
121 
121 
939 
: 60343 OPENED: 06JUN36 CLOSED: 17JUN35 
TECH. TYPE. OPCODE CB-RO.. DESCRIPTION, 
MILEAGE: 127195 
IDU 
I PRO 
I PRO 
IACC 
IACC 
D-116 
D-200 
9997 
D-619 
9399 
NO DESCRIPTION 
NO DESCRIPTION 
MISC. SHOP CHARGES 
NO DESCRIPTION 
SUBLET REPAIRS 
Press return to continue, S to list the story for this RO, or E to e-.it: 
RO NO: 186531 OPENED: 16MAY96 CLOSED: 16MAr?6 MILEAGE: 126457 
SA... TECH. TYPE. OPCODE CB-RO.. DESCRIPTION 
131 9 CME MA FRONT END THRUST ANGLE ALIGNMENT 
131 9 CME DONE OPERATION COMPLETED. 
Press return to continue, 
RO NO: 654621 OPENED: 
SA... TECH. TYPE. OPCODE. 
< 347 382 COI 24R 
347 382 COI 24S 
347 COI 9997 
S to list the story for this RO, or 
19MAR96 CLOSED: 29MAR96 MILEAGE: 
NO DESCRIPTION 
NO DESCRIPTION 
MISC. SHOP CHARGES 
E to exlt : ? 
125245 
11 
EXHIBIT C 
33 
VEHICLE REPAIR ESTIMATE 
Idaho Intermountain Claims 
1947 East 3300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Insured: Garff Enterprises 
Claimant: Carol Capato 
Date of Accident: July 3,1996 
Vehicle: 1986 Mercedes 190E 
Mileage: 129,266 
ITEM 
Airbag 1294600398 
Crash Sensor 0248201110 
Seat Belt, L/F 2018603185 
Driveline Flex Disc 
Totals 
Mech hours @ 58.00 
Total, Repair 
MECH HRS 
1.0 
1.5 
1.5 
1.4 
5.4 
Total, 
Tax @ 6.25% 
V\ w . »• 
VIN: WDBDA: 
PARTS 
$ 1,760.00 
1,070.00 
198.00 
93 00 
3,121.00 
313.20 
3,434.20 
214.64 
$ 3,648.84 
Appraiser Keith Nagel 
Repair Shop: Ken Garfif Mercedes-Benz Service 
Per : Ken Jensen, Shop Manager 
This is not an authorization to repair. Any repair authorr/ation must come from the owner of the 
vehicle. No supplements without prior authorization from the insurance company. 
BUYERS CVIDE 
J O H T A N T ; Spoken promises ar^ difficult to enforce. Ask the dealer to put ail promises In writing. Keep 
M f — f *±2m HOOCL VZ** V1HMUMMH 
OCALU JTOCX NUMMA (Oaaonai) 
WARRANTIES FOR THIS VEHICLE: 
AS IS-NO WARRANTY 
YOU WILL PAY ALL COSTS FOR ANY REPAIRS. The dealer assumes no responsibility for any repai 
regardless of any oral statements about the vehicle. 
WARRANTY 
• FULL • LIMITED WARRANTY. The dealer will pay % of the labor and % of the parts for tl-
covered systems that fail during the warranty period. Ask the dealer for a copy of the warrar 
document for a full explanation of warranty coverage, exclusions, and the dealer's rep. 
obligations. Under state law, "implied warranties" may give you even more rights. 
STSTEMS COYERED: DURA T)0 ht 
O SERVICE CONTRACT. A service contract is available at an extra charge on this vehicle. Ask fc 
details as to coverage, deductible, price, and exclusions. If you buy a service contract within 90 days c 
the time of sale, state law "implied warranties" may give you additional rights. 
PRE-PURCHASE INSPECTION: ASK THE DEALER IF YOU MAY HAVE THIS VEHICLE INSPECTED Bv 
YOUR MECHANIC EITHER ON OR OFF THE LOT. 
SEE THE BACK OF THIS FORM for important additional information, Including* a list of some major defect: 
that may occur In used motor vehicles. 
FORM 3 G E - 1 INS106 WASHINGTON 1-803-422-3217 
To Order Forms CALL OUTSiC€ W A S H I N G T O N 1-3CO-32S-7C95 
7 QAYS A WH£K 
2* HOURS A DAY 
WHOLiS* w.. FOR 
Below is a list of some major defects that may„occurJn,used motor vehicles 
Frame & Body 
Frame-cracks, corrective welds, or rusted through 
Dogtracks-bent-or twisted frame - • • ' ~ . 
Engine 
Oil leakage, excluding normal seepage 
Cracked block or head 
Belts missing or inoperable 
Knocks or misses related to camshaft lifters and oush rods 
Aonormal exhaust discnarge 
Transmission & Drive Shaft 
Improper fluid level or leakage, excluding normal seepage 
Cracked or damaged case which is visible 
'Abn^rmarnctse ofyibration caHed by faulty tfansmisSion" 
Vdnveshaft . j^ ' i £rjf* ^*Zh 2^% J 
Improper'shifting or functioning in'.any gear r 
Manual clutch slips or charters 
improper fluid level or leakage, excluding normal seepage 
Crackec or damaged housing which :s visible 
Abnormal noise or vibration caused by faulty differential 
Cooling System 
Leakage including radiator 
Improperly functioning water pump 
Electrical System 
Battery leakage 
Improperly functioning alternator,.generator, battery, or starter. 
Fuel System 
Visible ieaxage 
Inoperable Accessories 
Gauges or warning devices 
Air conditioner 
~ Heater" & Defroster ~ 
• Brake System 
. Failure warning light broken • • 
• -Pedal not firm un<jer -pressure (OOT-specs.)-
"Not enough pedal reserve (DOT specs.) 
Does not stop vehicle m snaight line (DOT specs 
Hoses damaged 
Drum or rotor too thin (Mfgr. specs.) • • • • 
Lining or pad thickness less than 1/32"incti 
Power unit not operating or leaking 
Structural or mechanical Darts damaged 
Steering System^ .. .. __^
 mm w .^  ^ mwm 
Too much free o.'ay at steering wheel (DOT specs 
Free play 'm linKage more than 1M inch 
Steering gear binds or jams 
Front wheel aligned irnproperty^DOJjspecs.) 
Power~uhit belts.cracked or "slipping 
PojJer unit'fluidlevel fmprojjer i 
. Suspension System 
Bail joint seals damaged 
Structural pans bent or damaged 
• * Stabilizer bar disconnected' - - - - ^ 
• * Spring broken * ' l»-*r:. 'Cr ,v !£•:•: 
Shock abscber mounting loose 
Rubber busmngs damaged or missing 
Radius rod damaged or missing 
Shock abscroer leaking or functioning improperly 
Tires 
Tread depth less than 2/32 inch' 
Sizes mismatched. 
'
r
' Visible "damage 
Wheels 
Visible cracks, damage or repairs • 
Mounting bolls toose or missing. 
Exhaust System -
Leakage 
06AL5R 
A22HESS 
SEE FOR COMPLAINTS 
IMPORTANT: The information on this form is part of any contract to buy this vehicle. Removal of this la 
before consumer purchase (except for purpose of test-driving) is a violation of federal lawT[16 C.F.R..455 
36 
CUSTOMER SIGNATURE C ^ ^ _ 
RECEIPT Or ORIGINAL COPY ACKNOWLEDGE:: 
•L-^t^e-^-gV 
EXHIBIT NO.. ? 
> > Q P M 8 (801) 466.9009 
GARFF ENTERPRISES, INC. 
OL0SMO8ILS • HYUNOAi 
SAAB • M6RC5D6S-3ENZ • VOLVO 
JAGUAR • HONDA 
WE OWE YOU 
VOID 
AFTER 
THIS DATE 
WORK PROMISED TO BE PERFORMED AT TIME OF SALE 
XQ\ Mio Ig osscaiprioN of; \8P vwrtm 
UCcNSc » C'w$TC.v.£3 5 NAMg SA* =S>*UN STCCX • 
ri?M \fiP22^z?> 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
HnWiw^ rt^eAl KtoVfoivvj fynrv\X-
o. 
NOTE: THE ABOVE PROMISED WORK IS THE J3NLY WORK TO BE PERFORMED FREE OF CHARGE. ANY 
ADDITIONAL WORK WILL BE CHARGED FOR. 
DUE TO INSURANCE/feGULATlONS - NO LOAN CARS AVAILABLE 
Signed: Sales Mgr. Signed: Customed J^. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the I & day of September, 1998,1 mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT {Capato v. Garff Enterprises, 
Inc.), postage prepaid, to: 
Robert H. Henderson 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-5000 
JtuutA^^1^ '<^ 
10361.brf 
14 
